SYMPOSIUM: 50 YEARS WITH THE 25TH AMENDMENT
INTERPRETING THE TWENTY-FIFTH AMENDMENT:
MAJOR CONTROVERSIES
Harold Hongju Koh*
When I teach the amendments to the U.S. Constitution, I have rarely
counted as far as 25. But after the 2016 election, my colleagues and I at
Yale Law School founded the Peter Gruber Rule of Law Clinic, a
practicum devoted to upholding the rule of law and human rights in our
splintered country. It soon occurred to me that I—and everyone else in
America—should know far, far more than we presently do about the
Twenty-fifth Amendment. 1 A Clinic student who was an expert on
* Sterling Professor of International Law, Yale Law School; Co-Founder, Peter Gruber Rule of Law
Clinic at Yale Law School. What follows is a lightly edited and footnoted version of remarks
originally prepared for delivery at the symposium on Fifty Years with the Twenty-fifth Amendment:
When a President is Unable to Discharge the Duties of Office, cosponsored on January 25, 2019 by
the Center for Constitutional Law at Akron Law School and the Ray C. Bliss Institute of Applied
Politics at the University of Akron. I am grateful to Professors Tracy A. Thomas, Brant Lee, and
David B. Cohen for their kind hospitality, to the other participants for their instructive papers and
comments, and to Michael Loughlin and Cara Newlon of Yale Law School for outstanding research
assistance. As a relative newcomer to the Twenty-fifth Amendment, I am not accustomed to speaking
at constitutional law conferences where historical questions are resolved by consulting James
Madison. But I was honored to do that here, learning from the great John Feerick—the father of the
Twenty-fifth Amendment—who has been an extraordinary friend and inspiration as I have delved
into this material. I especially thank Professor Joel Goldstein—a dear friend of more than forty-five
years—for introducing me to the intricacies of the Twenty-fifth Amendment, constantly instructing
me in it, and graciously correcting my misunderstandings. Finally, I thank my partners in the Peter
Gruber Rule of Law Clinic at Yale Law School Mike Wishnie, Phil Spector, Hope Metcalf; Fellow
Matt Blumenthal; and the Yale Law School Clinic student contributors to the 25th Amendment
Reader’s Guide: Varun Char, Colleen Culbertson, Sameer Jaywant, Chris Looney, Richard Medina,
Aleksandr Sverdlik, Emily Wanger, Zoe Weinberg, and Nathaniel Zelinsky. We are especially
grateful to the experts and friends who took the time to review drafts of the Reader’s Guide:
conference participants John Feerick, Joel Goldstein, and Norman Ornstein; Senators Birch Bayh and
Russ Feingold; former executive branch officials Avril Haines, W. Neil Eggleston, Ted Olson, and
John Podesta; journalists Linda Greenhouse, Jane Mayer, and Evan Osnos; Professors Akhil Reed
Amar, Sarah Cleveland, Richard M. Pious and David Pozen; and Doctors David Goldbloom and
Howard Zonana.
1. For present purposes, the most relevant part of the Twenty-fifth Amendment is Section
Four, which states:
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popular culture undertook an extensive survey of recent American
television shows and discovered that a surprisingly large number of them
had episodes discussing the Twenty-fifth Amendment. 2 But after taking
some time to “research” those episodes myself, I came to the grim
conclusion that in presenting the Twenty-fifth Amendment, every single
show had made some form of legal error.
Although Section Four of the Twenty-fifth Amendment is more than
fifty years old, it has never been invoked. If you haven’t reviewed the
amendment recently, Section Four provides that just nine government
officials—the Vice President plus eight executive department heads—can
separate the President from his powers and duties by voting and
transmitting to the Speaker of the House and President Pro Tempore of
the Senate a written declaration that “the President is unable to discharge
the powers and duties of his office.” Once that notification is sent, the
Vice President would immediately become the Acting President. Should
the President contest the claim, those charging his inability would have
four days to challenge his claim, during which time the Vice President
would act as President, and both houses of Congress would be called to
assemble within forty-eight hours to debate and decide the issue. Within
the three weeks that follow, Congress would be required to vote to resolve
“Whenever the Vice President and a majority of either the principal officers of the
executive departments or of such other body as Congress may by law provide, transmit to
the President pro tempore of the Senate and the Speaker of the House of Representatives
their written declaration that the President is unable to discharge the powers and duties of
his office, the Vice President shall immediately assume the powers and duties of the office
as Acting President.
Thereafter, when the President transmits to the President pro tempore of the Senate and
the Speaker of the House of Representatives his written declaration that no inability exists,
he shall resume the powers and duties of his office unless the Vice President and a majority
of either the principal officers of the executive department or of such other body as
Congress may by law provide, transmit within four days to the President pro tempore of
the Senate and the Speaker of the House of Representatives their written declaration that
the President is unable to discharge the powers and duties of his office. Thereupon
Congress shall decide the issue, assembling within forty-eight hours for that purpose if not
in session. If the Congress, within twenty-one days after receipt of the latter written
declaration, or, if Congress is not in session, within twenty-one days after Congress is
required to assemble, determines by two-thirds vote of both Houses that the President is
unable to discharge the powers and duties of his office, the Vice President shall continue
to discharge the same as Acting President; otherwise, the President shall resume the
powers and duties of his office.” U.S. CONST. amend. XXV, § 4.
2. See, e.g., Homeland: Clarity (Showtime television broadcast Apr. 15, 2018); Madam
Secretary: Sound and Fury (CBS television broadcast Jan. 14, 2018); Designated Survivor: Warriors
(ABC television broadcast Mar. 8, 2017); House of Cards: Chapter 43, NETFLIX (Mar. 4, 2016);
Madam Secretary: The Show Must Go On (CBS television broadcast Oct. 4, 2015); The West Wing:
Twenty-Five (NBC television broadcast May 14, 2003); 24: Day 2: 4:00 a.m. – 5:00 a.m. (Fox
television broadcast Apr. 29, 2003).
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the question of inability. A two-thirds vote from each house is needed to
transfer the President’s powers permanently to the Vice President, and if
either vote fails, he is permitted to resume his official duties. 3 Simply put,
at any moment, a political crisis could unfold on a remarkably compressed
constitutional timeline of less than 30 days. Nine sitting executive
officials could separate a sitting President from his powers immediately,
with the real possibility that he could permanently be separated from those
powers in less than a month. And the stakes would be incredibly high. Yet
this is a constitutional procedure that very few Americans understand and
a text that even many trained lawyers regularly misconstrue.
In contemplating this scenario, I grew frightened imagining the cable
television commentary that might accompany a real-life invocation of
Section Four of the Twenty-fifth Amendment. In a moment of grave
crisis, we could face the prospect that our country would be instructed on
the amendment’s operations by self-appointed “expert” talking heads on
cable news, who had first read the text of the amendment just moments
before.
Given the grave potential consequences of such public
misunderstanding at a moment of crisis, our Clinic decided that the
Constitution and the amendment—not to mention the American people—
deserve better than this. So we convened an extraordinary group of
students at Yale Law School to put together The 25th Amendment to the
United States Constitution: A Reader’s Guide, 4 a text designed to explain
carefully the Twenty-fifth Amendment’s text and operation to laypeople
and lawyers alike. In developing this guide over many months, we
consulted closely with leading experts and studied all of the available
sources. We looked at all available text, legislative history, academic
commentary, the limited number of existing relevant judicial analyses,
and all significant past studies on the issue—including works by many of
the scholars attending this conference. Through these efforts, we
developed what we hoped would be a user-friendly “reader’s guide” to the
amendment that could function as a “one-stop shop”—a single,
authoritative document to provide a fair and comprehensive reading of all
interpretive issues relating to the Twenty-fifth Amendment.
I would urge all of you to read, or at least consult, our Reader’s
Guide. But realistically recognizing that it is a dense document of nearly
3.
4.

U.S. CONST. amend. XXV.
YALE LAW SCH. RULE OF LAW CLINIC, THE TWENTY-FIFTH AMENDMENT TO THE UNITED
STATES CONSTITUTION: A READER’S GUIDE (April 18, 2018), https://law.yale.edu/system/
files/area/clinic/document/mn082208.yls.const.fnl.pdf [https://perma.cc/SA24-9FXU] [hereinafter
READER’S GUIDE].
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eighty single-spaced pages and 350 footnotes, I propose here to give it a
mini-reader’s guide of its own. Let me discuss the major interpretive
controversies regarding Section Four of the Twenty-fifth Amendment.
While the Guide discusses dozens of issues, the amendment’s text raises
essentially six core questions of interpretation:
1. Activation: Who may activate Section Four?
2. Inability: What condition qualifies as being “unable to
discharge the powers and duties of the office?”
3. Proof: How or by what evidence would one prove that
inability?
4. Institutional Roles: What roles should different institutional
actors within the government—including the Vice President,
Congress, and the courts—play in initiating and formally
reviewing a controversy under Section Four?
5. The “Morning After”: What happens the morning after the
conclusion of this compressed process?
6. Regularizing Process: If Congress wanted to make this
process more regular, what kind of legislation could it enact?
Our best answer to each of these questions comprises a de facto
primer on Section Four of the Twenty-fifth Amendment. If you still have
questions on each issue, or for a more complete answer, please consult the
relevant section of the Reader’s Guide itself.
I. ACTIVATION: WHO MAY ACTIVATE SECTION FOUR?
Section Four may be activated in two ways. First, under the most
straightforward option, the Vice President plus an eight-person majority
of the fifteen principal officers of the executive departments can activate
Section Four by taking a vote and finding the sitting President “unable to
discharge the powers and duties of his office.” 5
Notice that Section Four doesn’t mention “the Cabinet.” The relevant
vote here is to be taken by the fifteen heads of the “executive departments”
that are specified in 5 U.S.C. § 101, and Congress can add new
departments to that list at any time. 6 Thus, currently, nine officials are
5. U.S. CONST. amend. XXV, § 4.
6. See also 111 CONG. REC. 7938 (1965) (statement of Rep. Waggonner); id. at 7941
(statement of Rep. Poff); id. at 7944-45 (statement of Rep. Whitener); id. at 7954 (statement of Rep.
Gilbert); JOHN D. FEERICK, THE TWENTY-FIFTH AMENDMENT: ITS COMPLETE HISTORY AND
APPLICATIONS (2014). See also Freytag v. Comm’r, 501 U.S. 868, 887 n.4 (1991) (noting in dicta
that in interpreting the Appointments Clause, the Court is not bound by “the fact that the [Twenty-
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needed to initiate the process of removal: the Vice President and eight
principal officers. 7 Our best reading is that acting heads of the department
may vote, a reading supported by then-Senator Robert F. Kennedy’s
statements in the 1965 floor debate, which was subsequently accepted by
most other Senators. 8
The fact that voting power is allocated to the heads of executive
departments—and not to cabinet members—is relevant because it restricts
voting to a group of executive officials that is ordinarily both named and
confirmed by the Senate. 9 But the belief that Twenty-fifth Amendment
participation is limited to Senate-confirmed cabinet members may be a
common misconception. In one episode of Madam Secretary, for
example, the Vice President tells an acting Cabinet Secretary, “you’re
Acting Secretary, so you can’t vote,” which is wrong; just minutes later,
the Secretary of State announces that “the Cabinet voted tonight to invoke
Section Four of the Twenty-fifth Amendment,” 10 another legally
erroneous statement. 11
The second possibility for activation, which Dean Feerick has
discussed, is for Congress to create by law a different deliberative body—
in the words of the amendment, “such other body as Congress may by law
provide”—to determine whether or not to invoke Section Four. 12 In the
landmark separation of powers case INS v. Chadha, the Supreme Court
held that all duly enacted “laws” require bicameralism and presentment:
a majority of both houses must pass a piece of legislation and present it to
the President for signature or a veto. 13 As Dean Feerick points out, if
Congress has sufficient votes, it can pass a law creating a new deliberative
body. In this scenario, the new congressional body would replace the role

fifth] Amendment strictly limits the term ‘department’ to those departments named in 5 U.S.C. §
101”).
7. Currently, the fifteen principal officers for purposes of Twenty-fifth Amendment are the
principal officers of the following departments: State, Treasury, Defense, Justice, the Interior,
Agriculture, Commerce, Labor, Health and Human Services, Housing and Urban Development,
Transportation, Energy, Education, Veterans Affairs, and Homeland Security. 5 U.S.C. § 101 (2018).
8. See READER’S GUIDE, supra note 4, at 12-13; 111 CONG. REC. 15,380 (1965) (statement
of Sen. Kennedy); id. at 15,382 (statement of Sen. Kennedy); id. at 15,385 (statement of Sen. Javits).
9. At this writing, for example, President Trump’s Cabinet includes the White House Acting
Chief of Staff and six additional agency heads beyond the fifteen identified in 5 U.S.C. § 101 (2018).
The Cabinet, THE WHITE HOUSE, https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-trump-administration/the-cabinet
[https://perma.cc/Q6SS-BSNC].
10. Madam Secretary: Sound and Fury (CBS television broadcast Jan. 14, 2018).
11. See READER’S GUIDE, supra note 4, at 11-12.
12. FEERICK, supra note 6, at 121.
13. 462 U.S. 919 (1983).
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of the department heads, and become the relevant voting actor, along with
the Vice President. 14
Note also that these two modes of activation are “either/or,” not
“both/and”: the relevant vote can come either from the Vice President plus
a majority of the executive department heads (a purely executive form of
initiating transfer of powers), or the Vice President plus a majority of the
other body (which may be largely or entirely drawn from the legislative
branch).
Little has been said or written about the limitations surrounding the
creation of this “other body” by Congress, beyond the requirement that it
be created by law, through bicameralism and presentment, not internal
House or Senate rule. Presumably, other constitutional limitations might
come into play. Consider first, for example, the separation of powers
concerns that would arise if judges and justices were placed onto such a
deliberative body—an idea considered and rejected by Congress in
1965. 15 Second, the text of the Twenty-fifth Amendment highlights an
apparent preference against the new body’s being composed exclusively
of medical experts, because the inability decision is considered
fundamentally political, not medical. 16
Upon transmission by the Vice President and the majority of
whichever of these two entities has authority—executive department
heads or a new legislatively created body— the President is separated
immediately from the exercise of the powers and duties of his or her
office. 17 The Vice President assumes presidential responsibilities and
duties under the title of “Acting President.” 18

14. FEERICK, supra note 6, at 121. While the “other body” may be legislatively created, it need
not include legislative officials. For example, Congress could decide to make it the top seven Cabinet
members, or all confirmed Cabinet members, including acting heads, or some other assortment of
executive officials.
15. For examples from the debate over the earlier proposal, see, e.g., 111 CONG. REC. 15,382
(1965) (statement of Sen. Bayh) (“This would not preclude Congress, in its wisdom, from establishing
another panel, perhaps of the majority and minority leaders of both Houses, the Chief Justice of the
Supreme Court.”); id. at 7,942 (statement of Rep. McCulloch) (“[T]he suggestion has been made that
a commission be created which might be composed of Supreme Court jurists, elected leaders of
Congress, and members of the Cabinet.”); see also Miller Center Comm’n No. 4, Report of the
Commission on Presidential Disability and the Twenty-Fifth Amendment, WHITE BURKETT MILLER
CTR. PUB. AFF. 13 (1988), http://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1000&context=
twentyfifth_amendment_reports [https://perma.cc/6XBM-4ZWD].
16. See, e.g., Birch Bayh, The Twenty-Fifth Amendment: Dealing with Presidential Disability,
30 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 437, 446-47 (1995) (discussing the need for a removal decision to have
political legitimacy).
17. U.S. CONST. amend. XXV, § 4.
18. Id.; see READER’S GUIDE, supra note 4, at 43.
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This entire process would rapidly generate an extraordinary moment:
once the initial “inability” letter is received by the Speaker of the House
and the President Pro Tempore of the Senate, the President is forced to
decide whether or not to contest the letter by declaring that he is, in fact,
able. And if he does contest the letter, the decision is thrown into the
House and Senate, which are required to assemble within 48 hours for
votes to be held in both houses in 21 calendar (not business or legislative)
days. 19
II. INABILITY: THE “UNABLE TO DISCHARGE THE POWERS AND DUTIES
OF THE OFFICE” STANDARD
From the beginning of the process, all decision-makers acting under
Section Four will be forced to address the next, and most important,
question: how to determine whether the president is “unable” under
Section Four? It is important to note that the constitutional term used is
“unable,” and that no references are made to medical terms or diagnoses.
Obviously, Section Four covers mental or physical incapacitation, but as
Professor Goldstein has aptly pointed out, there is no formal definition of
inability. 20 Instead, inability is designed deliberately in Section Four to be
a flexible standard that can apply to a wide variety of unforeseen
emergencies. For example, inability could arise if the presidential plane
goes missing, if the President becomes unconscious, or if—as portrayed
in The West Wing—the President’s daughter is kidnapped, thereby
generating a conflict of interest. 21
Section Four’s question is whether the President is unable to
discharge the powers and duties of the office, not why he or she is unable.
Inability is determined by a “totality of the circumstances” test, and
decision-makers must focus on the President’s actual state, rather than on
the causes of that state. 22 Thus, the scholarly consensus is that the drafters
intended that the amendment cover “any imaginable circumstance[]” that
might render the President unfit to perform the duties of office. 23
19. U.S. CONST. amend. XXV, § 4; see READER’S GUIDE, supra note 4, at 43.
20. See Joel K. Goldstein, Celebrating the Presidential Inability Provisions of the Twenty-Fifth
Amendment: Dealing with Presidential Disability, 10 CONLAWNOW 119, 132-33 (2019); see
generally READER’S GUIDE, supra note 4, at 21 (discussing the relevant scholarship on the role of
medical opinions in the removal process).
21. The West Wing: Twenty-Five (NBC television broadcast May 14, 2003).
22. READER’S GUIDE, supra note 4, at 23-24.
23. Fordham University School of Law Second Clinic on Presidential Succession, Report, Fifty
Years After the Twenty-Fifth Amendment: Recommendations for Improving the Presidential
Succession System, 86 FORDHAM L. REV. 917 (2017) (quoting KENNETH R. CRISPELL & CARLOS F.
GOMEZ, HIDDEN ILLNESS IN THE WHITE HOUSE 209-10 (1988)).
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Decision-makers should focus less on the specific characteristics of the
inability, and more on the overall effects of the inability: i.e. whether the
totality of the circumstances suggests that inability prevents the President
from discharging the powers and duties of his office. For that reason,
many pages of the Reader’s Guide are devoted to reviewing every
historically known case of presidential inability. In 1965, Congressman
Richard Poff, then a leading Republican member of the House and an
architect of the amendment, argued that being unable to make a rational
decision would constitute inability. 24 In other words, if the President fails
to demonstrate that he can act rationally, he fails to demonstrate the
minimum competence needed to fulfill his official duties. A President
may be found “unable” if he is unconscious, irrational, or on perpetual life
support. He is not removed from his office; his powers are simply
transferred to the Vice President because of a serious, but hopefully
transitory situation.
Recent speculation surrounding President Donald Trump’s mental
health and its relevance to the Twenty-fifth Amendment have highlighted
the importance of this distinction.25 Some pundits have incorrectly argued
that a President is essentially immunized from Twenty-fifth Amendment
removal if he previously demonstrated an inability to act rationally on the
campaign trail, but was elected anyway. 26 If a President demonstrated an
inability to act rationally while campaigning and was elected regardless—
the argument goes—it should be presumed that the people have taken
these deficiencies into account yet voted for the candidate anyway,
thereby “washing out” this objection. But there is no evidence that these
commentators are correct; nothing in the historical record supports this
speculation. A democratic vote does not nullify constitutional authority.
If, for whatever reason, a sitting President were ever unable to make a
rational decision, the Twenty-fifth Amendment allows for him to be

24. FEERICK, supra note 6, at 117 (Section 4 provides for cases “when the President, by
reason of mental d[isa]bility[,] is unable or unwilling to make any rational decision, including
particularly the decision to stand aside.”).
25. See, I Am Part of the Resistance Inside the Trump Administration, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 5,
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/09/05/opinion/trump-white-house-anonymous2018),
resistance.html [https://perma.cc/X6NA6N]; Annie Karni, Washington’s Growing Obsession: The
Twenty-Fifth Amendment, POLITICO (Jan. 3, 2018 09:09 PM), https://www.politico.com/story/
2018/01/03/trump-25th-amendment-mental-health-322625 [https://perma.cc/54FN-QURZ].
26. See, e.g., Joshua Zeitz, Why the 25th Amendment Doesn’t Apply to Trump–No Matter What
MAGAZINE.
(Jan.
10,
2018),
https://www.politico.com/
He
Tweets,
POLITICO
magazine/story/2018/01/10/25th-amendment-trump-216267
[https://perma.cc/KD7G-FXV5]
(arguing that the amendment does not apply to “a president who already demonstrated those traits
when the people, in their wisdom, elected him to office.”).
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deemed “unable” to discharge the powers and duties of the office, whether
or not the signs of that inability were visible or even glaring earlier.
During the Trump Presidency, it has become commonplace to hear
political analysts say that former Secretary of Defense Jim Mattis, former
Chief of Staff John Kelly, or former White House counsel Don McGahn
each at various times played the “adult in the room” to discourage
irrational behavior from President Trump. 27 These discussions are
striking—and deeply troubling—because the Constitution assumes that
the President will be the adult in the room. After all, all three of these
officials are now back in the private sector. If at any time the President is
unable to function, unassisted, as the adult in the room capable of making
rational decisions, it is time to question his ability to discharge the powers
and duties of the office. Irrespective of a President’s actions or tendencies
that may have been evidenced as a candidate, a demonstrated current
inability to discharge his official duties rationally can render him unable
to serve under Section Four.
III. PROOF: HOW DO YOU PROVE AN INABILITY TO DISCHARGE THE
POWERS AND DUTIES OF THE OFFICE?
Once Congress comes to an understanding about what constitutes
“unable,” it is forced to grapple with the issue of how to prove or disprove
that the President is in fact unable. This is an evidentiary question: a
question of fact. As Professor Goldstein’s superb article in the University
of Pennsylvania Journal of Constitutional Law makes clear, the Framers
of the Twenty-fifth Amendment thought that mental, as well as physical,
illness could render a President “unable to discharge” his presidential
powers and duties. 28 So medical evidence can unquestionably inform the
inability determination. Still, there is no statement or suggestion in the
Constitution that medical expertise or diagnosis is required or necessary
to make the inability determination. In fact, scholars have expressed
concern that if doctors were to become overly involved in the removal
determination, their attempts to make medical assessments might invade

27. See, e.g, Matthew Yglesias, There never were any “adults in the room,” VOX (Dec. 21,
2018 10:30 AM), https://www.vox.com/policy-and-politics/2018/12/21/18151079/mattis-adults-inthe-room [https://perma.cc/7WGU-87BL].
28. Joel K. Goldstein, Talking Trump and the Twenty-Fifth Amendment: Correcting the
Record on Section 4, 21 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 73, 78 (2018).
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the President’s space, thereby further impeding his ability to carry out the
office’s duties. 29
A President with no mental illness or disability could still be unfit to
serve if his erratic behavior indicates that he is incapable of making a
rational decision. At the same time, it is easy to imagine that nearly all the
time, a President with a medical condition could still discharge the powers
and duties in a highly effective manner. For example, an individual who
suffers from seizures, but could sense a seizure coming on, would have an
identifiable medical condition. But if that person were responsible and
competent, he would still be able to carry out his duties and discharge the
functions of the office at times that he was not afflicted by his medical
conditions. These thought experiments highlight why the determination
of inability should not be based exclusively on medical evaluations.
There has recently been a lot of discussion in the context of the
Twenty-fifth Amendment of the “Goldwater Rule,” which states that a
“psychiatrist may share with the public his or her expertise about [a public
figure’s] psychiatric issues in general,” but that “it is unethical for a
psychiatrist to offer a professional opinion unless he or she has conducted
an examination and has been granted proper authorization for such a
statement.” 30 This rule emerged after the 1964 election, when
psychiatrists began to express concerns regarding Senator and presidential
candidate Barry Goldwater’s mental state. 31 The American Psychiatric
Association’s Principles of Medical Ethics stated at the time—and still
states—that a psychiatrist cannot opine on the mental health of a patient
unless she has personally examined that patient. 32
The “Goldwater Rule” has prompted a flurry of discussion regarding
Section Four. Does it mean that if the President simply barred any
competent, unbiased doctor from ever examining him, he could never be
declared unable to perform the powers and duties of the office and
removed under the Twenty-fifth Amendment? Upon considering this
question, the Reader’s Guide concluded that the APA’s principle does not
function as a complete bar to the constitutional remedy of Twenty-fifth
Amendment removal. 33 First, as explained earlier, the amendment does
not in fact require a medical assessment, examination, or justification for

29. See READER’S GUIDE, supra note 4, at 26; John D. Feerick, The Twenty-Fifth Amendment:
An Explanation and Defense, 30 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 481, 502 (1995) (discussing a conference
where multiple scholars expressed this opinion).
30. AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, THE PRINCIPLES OF MEDICAL ETHICS, § 7.3.
31. READER’S GUIDE, supra note 4, at 37.
32. AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, supra note 30.
33. READER’S GUIDE, supra note 4, at 37.
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removal. Second, the APA’s principle is not law—it is merely an internal
rule of a professional association. At most, the APA’s rule makes it harder
to implement the amendment. Third, it is quite clear from reading the
relevant scholarship and historical records that Congress could use its
compulsory powers if necessary, to require the President to undergo a
medical examination that would provide the desired direct medical
evidence on presidential inability. 34 For these reasons, the issue of the
“Goldwater Rule” has likely been overplayed in discussions of the
Twenty-fifth Amendment.
IV. INSTITUTIONAL ROLES: THE ROLE OF THE VICE PRESIDENT,
CONGRESS, AND THE COURTS
A.

The Role of the Vice President

If the Vice President assumes the role of acting President, he can then
exercise all the powers of the presidency without becoming President. 35
The original President is sidelined and incapacitated from acting as the
Chief Executive, but is still the only elected President that we have.
However, once the Vice President becomes the Acting President, the
entire machinery of the executive branch—including the Justice
Department, the White House Counsel, and all White House staff—shift
to serve the Acting President in the same manner as they would serve
anyone exercising the powers and duties of the President himself. 36
As noted above, if this were to happen, the constitutional action taken
would be a “power transfer,” not removal from office. Thus, it may be
temporary, the President can seek to regain power if he becomes able
again, and the decision is not a judgment on his or her morality or place
in history. Rather, the final decision should reflect his or her capacity or
ability to discharge the powers and duties of his office, for whatever
reason.
What prevents the Vice President from abusing his powers during
this “acting” period? As a threshold matter, the period of time he serves
as Acting President is likely to be quite limited. But more fundamentally,
the limitation on vice presidential action is political. Especially in
circumstances of medical incapacitation, the Vice President will be
34. See READER’S GUIDE, supra note 4, at 37-38, 58; see also S. REP. NO. 89-66, at 3 (1965)
(explaining “that Congress should be permitted to collect all necessary evidence” (emphasis added)).
35. See READER’S GUIDE, supra note 4, at 45; Joel K. Goldstein, The Vice Presidency and the
Twenty-Fifth Amendment: The Power of Reciprocal Relationships, in MANAGING CRISIS:
PRESIDENTIAL DISABILITY AND THE TWENTY-FIFTH AMENDMENT 191 (Robert E. Gilbert ed., 2000).
36. See READER’S GUIDE, supra note 4, at 48.
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hesitant to exceed his mandate by doing too much. When President
Ronald Reagan was incapacitated by shooting, for example, Vice
President George H. W. Bush acted diffidently, expecting that President
Reagan would eventually return to office and not want too many critical
decisions to have been made during his absence. 37
This process will generally conclude with either the President
returning to service, as President Reagan did, or the President being
declared unable. In that case, the Vice President remains as Acting
President, but never technically assumes the Office of the Presidency or
the title of “President.” Because there is never a vice presidential vacancy,
an Acting President under Section Four does not have authority to
nominate a Vice President to take office upon congressional confirmation
under Section Two of the amendment.
B.

The Role of Congress

The Twenty-fifth Amendment does not provide a specific set of
procedures or guidance on burdens of proof for Congress to follow during
deliberations regarding a President’s charged inability to discharge the
powers and duties of the office. The only statement in the amendment is
that Congress must “determine[] by two-thirds vote of both Houses that
the President is unable to discharge the powers and duties of his
office . . . .” 38
A careful reading of the amendment highlights that each house must
independently vote for a finding of presidential inability by a two-thirds
supermajority. Congress therefore cannot add up the pro-inability senators
and Members of the House and say that it constitutes two-thirds of the
total. One could imagine a situation in which 100% of one body thinks the
President is unable, but only half of the other body votes for removal. That
would not be enough to give the requisite two-thirds in each house for
removal; accordingly, the President would be restored to office.
During the twenty-one days Congress has to determine inability, it
can exercise compulsory process over the President to get relevant
information. A President being challenged could, and likely would, assert
various privileges to prevent Congress from gaining information—
whether statutory (e.g., the Health Insurance Portability and

37. Formal Twenty-fifth Amendment procedures were not invoked after the 1981 shooting of
President Reagan, in part because Vice President Bush was wary of appearing to engage in a powergrab. See READER’S GUIDE, supra note 4, at 28-30.
38. U.S. CONST. amend. XXV, § 4.
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Accountability Act (HIPAA), 39 the medical privacy act that all of us
encounter when we go to the doctor), state common law (e.g., attorneyclient privilege), or federal constitutional law (e.g., executive privilege).
Even so, Congress’s capacity to seek and obtain the relevant information
would likely overcome these privileges under most circumstances. 40 The
President would, of course, have a chance to make his case to Congress
that he is in fact able to resume his official duties. 41 But if the President
were to frustrate the constitutional process, such actions could constitute
a high crime or misdemeanor that could count as an impeachable
offense. 42 Additionally, it is possible that a President’s attempts to
interfere with the process could be characterized as an obstruction of
justice, prosecutable whenever the President is not deemed immune from
criminal prosecution.
C.

The Role of the Courts

On the fundamental question of a President’s ability or inability to
remain in office, the substance of the determination appears textually
committed to the legislative branch, and not to the courts. 43 Based on the
Supreme Court’s opinions in Baker v. Carr 44 and more recently Zivotofsky
v. Clinton, 45 the Court would be unlikely to reexamine Congress’s
determination of a president’s ability or inability under Section Four. The
merits of the substance of the determination of presidential ability would
therefore likely be a nonjusticiable political question.
Some might argue that the Court would be similarly unlikely to
reexamine issues of congressional procedure regarding a transfer of
presidential powers under the Twenty-fifth Amendment. But the 1993
impeachment case of Nixon v. United States (which concerned Judge
Walter, not President Richard, Nixon) suggests that an obvious departure

39. Pub. L. 104-191 (1996).
40. See READER’S GUIDE, supra note 4, at 60.
41. Id. at 63-64
42. Id. at 64; see also Laurence H. Tribe, Defining ‘High Crimes and Misdemeanors’: Basic
Principles, 67 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 712, 718 (1999) (defining “high crimes and misdemeanors” as
actions that “constitute major offenses against our very system of government, or serious abuses of
the governmental power with which a public official has been entrusted (as in the case of a public
official who accepts a bribe in order to turn his official powers to personal or otherwise corrupt ends),
or grave wrongs in pursuit of governmental power.”).
43. U.S. CONST. amend. XXV, § 4.
44. 369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962) (holding that certain Congressional or executive decisions which
have “an unusual need for unquestioning adherence” qualify as political questions that are nonreviewable by the courts).
45. 566 U.S. 189, 195 (2012) (significantly narrowing the “political question” doctrine).
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from the procedural rules in the text of Section Four could be reviewed by
a court to ensure that the constitutionally outlined process is being
followed. 46 Still, absent patent and material departures from the text
specified in the Twenty-fifth Amendment, for prudential reasons, the
court would still likely treat most procedural challenges to the application
of the amendment as a nonjusticiable political question.
V. “THE MORNING AFTER”: AFTER INVOCATION OF THE TWENTY-FIFTH
AMENDMENT
It is certainly possible that after the roughly one-month-long process
to investigate inability, Congress could vote not to permanently separate
the President from his powers. If this should occur, and the President’s
inability grows more and more apparent, there is no bar to Section Four
being invoked again. But while there are no legal limitations on the ability
to reassert Section Four, there are obvious political constraints against
doing so. 47 For example, the President could dismiss the eight executive
heads who had declared him unable for doing so. So as a practical matter,
one shot might be all the removal advocates get.
Still, the President cannot dismiss the Vice President simply for
being “disloyal.” As Professor Goldstein has pointed out, one of the Vice
President’s strongest constitutional assets is the simple fact that he cannot
be fired by his boss. 48 And regardless of whether the President is declared
able or unable, the Twenty-fifth Amendment in no way functions as a bar
to traditional presidential impeachment. So the Twenty-fifth Amendment
and traditional presidential impeachment—as well as legislative
investigation and criminal prosecution—could all work together
interactively and synergistically over a period of time to achieve a
President’s removal. 49

46. 506 U.S. 224, 245 (1993). In the Nixon case, the Supreme Court held that the Senate
impeachment of Judge Nixon for federal crimes was nonjusticiable, but noted that “judicial review
would ensure that the Senate adhered to a minimum set of procedural standards in conducting
impeachment trials.” Id.
47. See READER’S GUIDE, supra note 4, at 72-73.
48. U.S. CONST. art. 2, § 4; see generally JOEL K. GOLDSTEIN, THE WHITE HOUSE VICE
PRESIDENCY: THE PATH TO SIGNIFICANCE, MONDALE TO BIDEN (2016).
49. For a discussion of how this might unfold in the present setting, see Zucked,
(Feb.
8,
2019)
https://www.stitcher.com/podcast/skullduggery/e/
SKULLDUGGERY
58662799?autoplay=true [https://perma.cc/CK6X-HLNB] (interview with Harold Hongju Koh).
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VI. REGULARIZING PROCESS: CONGRESSIONAL POLICY PRESCRIPTIONS
Finally, there is little doubt that Congress is remarkably unprepared
to deal with the prospect of a Twenty-fifth Amendment, Section Four
scenario. To prepare the country better for the time-compressed, highstakes crisis envisioned under the Twenty-fifth Amendment, the Reader’s
Guide proposes a number of congressional actions.
First, Congress should pass standing rules, clarify which committees
have jurisdiction over these proposals, adopt formal standing rules and
procedures, and establish a standing advisory committee of reliable
constitutional experts who could be asked for advice on how a Twentyfifth Amendment process should operate if it should ever become
necessary. Second, Congress should establish procedures to clarify some
of the nuances surrounding the transition of power. To this end, in a joint
resolution, Congress could simply affirm some of the aforementioned
agreed-upon interpretive conclusions about the meaning of the text of the
Twenty-fifth Amendment.
Once the joint resolution passes Congress, it would be sent to the
President for presentment. If the President were to veto it, a two-thirds
vote of both houses would be needed to override the veto. This is a very
high bar. Particularly if a President presented with such a bill were
rumored to be “unable,” he or she would almost certainly veto any
resolution of this sort. Meanwhile, when a stable President is in office,
Congress will be unlikely to view legislation relating to the Twenty-fifth
Amendment as a high legislative priority. This, of course, illustrates a
fundamental paradox of government: when you need action, people will
be reluctant to act; but until a crisis arises, people won’t want to create a
fuss by acting to head off an obvious looming problem.
Once the shadow of Section Four appears, it almost inevitably
becomes too late for a political solution regarding the country’s
preparedness for a forced transition. Therefore, it is unlikely that more
nuanced procedures to regularize the operation of the amendment will be
developed in the near future. But this inability to develop a standing
political solution only highlights the need to strengthen our shared
understandings of the Twenty-fifth Amendment’s terms and processes
now, in order to minimize the role of partisan advocates in the public
discourse surrounding potential removal whenever the moment of crisis
should come.

278

CONLAWNOW

[10:263

CONCLUSION
In closing, we should not forget that, almost by definition, Section
Four will be invoked only in a moment of great stress for our country.
Once the idea of separating a president from his powers is being actively
discussed, we are already on shaky ground. But it is precisely at those
challenging moments that all Americans who love their Constitution—
and the rule of law for which it stands—must take care that the law be
faithfully interpreted. This will require each of us, particularly in a future
moment of political turmoil, to retain fidelity to the rule of law and stick
to principles of consistent and faithful constitutional interpretation.
In writing our Reader’s Guide on the Twenty-fifth Amendment, a
primary goal of Yale Law School’s Peter Gruber Rule of Law Clinic was
civic education. I find it amazing that I didn’t learn about the intricacies
of the amendment when I was in school, but many decades later, more
than thirty years after becoming a professor who happens on occasion to
teach constitutional law. But only a few people in my field, nearly all of
whom happen to be at this Symposium, really know anything about this
subject at all.
For that reason, my parting message is “Teach your children well.”
You can give them—and your law students and colleagues—our Reader’s
Guide as a present: it is free and there is an executive summary in case
they want to get the short version. Teachers should educate their students
about the Twenty-fifth Amendment, reviewing the entire history of
previous physical and mental situations that have—or should have—
triggered the amendment. This analysis would connect the Twenty-fifth
Amendment, and our current political moment, to basic lessons in
American history.
When I was in grade school, we learned to type by memorizing and
repeating that famous phrase, attributed to Patrick Henry: “Now is the
time for all good Americans to come to the aid of their country.” If and
when a debate under Section Four of the Twenty-fifth Amendment ever
arrives, we will be at precisely such an historical moment. We should be
ready for that challenge whenever it may face us, by arming ourselves
with a thorough knowledge of how this vitally important, yet so littleunderstood, corner of our Constitution should function in a moment of
high national stress.

